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Recent Developments 
MV A v. Richards 
The Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment Does Not Extend to Civil 
Administrative Driver's License Suspension Proceedings 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to 
extend the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment to Motor Vehicle 
Administration license suspension 
hearings. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. 
Richards, 356 Md. 356, 739 A.2d 
58 (1999). The court specifically held 
the rule inapplicable in civil 
administrative license suspension 
hearings under section 16-205.1 of 
the Transportation Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland. The 
court further held that the 
constitutionality of a motor vehicle 
stop may not be challenged in the 
resulting administrative proceeding. 
On October 24, 1997, at 
approximately 12:30 a.m., a 
Maryland State Trooper, patrolling in 
the Carroll County town of 
Westminster, observed a vehicle 
stopped in the middle of the road. 
Aware that Westminster had been 
experiencing a wave of nighttime 
burglaries and vehicle thefts, the 
trooper decided to follow the vehicle. 
The trooper then stopped the 
vehicle to determine what business the 
driver had in the neighborhood. As 
the trooper spoke to the driver, David 
Richards, ("Richards") he detected a 
strong odor of alcohol. The trooper 
administered a field sobriety test, and 
Richards was subsequently arrested. 
While under custodial arrest, Richards 
refused to take a chemical breath test 
ByLeeADix 
to determine his blood-alcohol level. 
In accordance with administrative 
procedure section 16-205.1 of the 
Transportation Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, the 
trooper issued an order suspending 
Richards's driver's license. 
Richards requested a hearing 
under section 16-205.1 (f) to 
determine the validity of his driver's 
license suspension. The 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") 
concluded that Richards's license was 
properly suspended, based on his 
refusal to take the chemical breath 
test. Moreover, the ALJ concluded 
that reasonable grounds existed for the 
stop and that the trooper acted in good 
faith. The Circuit Court for Carroll 
County, on judicial review of the 
ALl's determination, reversed the 
suspension of Richards's license, 
stating that insufficient justification 
existed to support the stop. The 
Motor Vehicle Administration 
("MV A") petitioned the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland for a writ of 
certiorari, which it granted to consider 
whether the exclusionary rule applies 
in driver's license suspension 
proceedings conducted pursuant to 
section 16-205.1(f) barring the 
introduction of evidence obtained 
during an unlawful motor vehicle stop. 
The court began its analysis by 
reviewing the language of section 16-
205.1, specifically the implied consent 
provision. Richards, 356 Md. at 
363, 739 A.2d at 62. The court 
noted that the statute established that 
any person driving on a public 
roadway in Maryland has implicitly 
consented, if reasonably requested, 
to a test to determine breath or blood 
alcohol level. 1d. Additionally, the 
statute provided that refusal to take 
the test will result in automatic 
suspension of the person's license to 
drive. Id. The court of appeals, in 
reviewing the statute, stated that 
section 16-205.1 (f)(7) provides that 
the administrative hearing is not to 
consider the constitutionality of the 
stop, or the possible exclusion of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence. 
!d. at 367, 739 A2d at 64. 
The court examined the 
Supreme Court's position in 
extending the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment beyond the 
criminal trial context. Upon review 
of numerous decisions issued by the 
Supreme Court during the past 
quarter century, the court of appeals 
concluded that the Supreme Court 
refused to extend the exclusionary 
rule to civil proceedings, with the 
exception of civil in rem forfeiture 
proceedings. 1d. at 368, 739 A2d 
at 65. The Supreme Court viewed 
the in rem forfeiture proceedings as 
quasi-criminal in nature and, 
therefore, warranted application of 
exclusionary rule. Id. In 1998, the 
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Supreme Court again refused to 
extend the exclusionary rule beyond 
criminal proceedings. Id. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held 
that the exclusionary rule is "applicable 
only where its deterrence benefits 
outweigh its 'substantial social costs. '" 
Id. at 369, 739 A.2d at 65 (quoting 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897,907 (1984)). 
The court of appeals next 
examined the case law of Maryland 
addressing the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. 
Id at 370, 739 A.2d at 66. Thecourt 
found that outside of the criminal trial 
context that the exclusionary rule is 
applicable only in civil in rem forfeiture 
proceedings due to the quasi-criminal 
nature of the hearings. Id In so 
holding, the court of appeals reiterated 
the Supreme Court's statement that 
''the 'prime purpose' of the rule, ifnot 
the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful 
police conduct.'" Id. at 371, 739 
A.2d at 67 (quoting United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) 
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))). 
Additionally, the court stated that the 
marginal deterrence of extending the 
exclusionary rule, coupled with the 
substantial cost, does not justify its 
application in civil proceedings. Id 
After completing its examination 
of the language of section 16-205.1, 
the Supreme Court's application of the 
exclusionary rule, and the case law of 
Maryland, the court of appeals 
addressed the issue of whether the 
exclusionary rule applied in 
administrative license suspension 
proceedings conducted pursuant to 
section 16-205.1(f). The court 
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rejected the proposition that 
proceedings under this section are 
quasi-criminal in nature. Id. at 372, 
739 A.2d at 67. The court stated that 
although the suspension or revocation 
of one's license under section 16-
205.1 may appear "purely punitive" 
and "quasi-criminal" in nature, the 
ultimate goal is to prevent 
unscrupulous or incompetent persons 
from continuing to drive automobiles. 
Id at 373, 739 A.2d at 68. 
Having decided that the license 
suspension proceedings were not 
quasi-criminal, the court used the 
traditional cost benefit analysis to 
determine whether the exclusionary 
rule applied in administrative license 
suspension proceedings. Id at 372, 
739 A.2d at 67. The court opined 
that whether the case involved test 
refusal or test failure, the deterrent 
effect of exclusion would be 
insignificant, as the police already 
suffer exclusion of unlawfully seized 
evidence from criminal proceedings. 
Id. at 374, 739 A.2d at 69. 
Additionally, the court noted that the 
MY A and police departments operate 
as independent agencies, and 
imposing the exclusionary rule in 
license suspension proceedings would 
do little to deter unlawful police 
action. Id at 375, 739 A.2d at 69. 
Turning to the cost side of the 
test, the court concluded that applying 
the exclusionary rule in hearings 
conducted pursuant to section 16-
205.1 would create substantial cost. 
Id. at 376, 739 A.2d at 69. The court 
stated that applying the rule would 
complicate the proceedings and 
severely undermine its purpose to 
protect the public. Id. 
With it decision in Richards, the 
court of appeals continues to strictly 
adhere to its prior decisions and the 
Supreme Court's precedent of 
refusing to extend the exclusionary rule 
to civil proceedings. The court clearly 
stated that any future extension of the 
rule to civil proceedings in Maryland 
will occur only when the goal of 
deterring unlawful police practices 
outweighs the social benefit of not 
applying the rule. 
